

Sir George Grey and the 1857 Indian Rebellion: the unmaking and making of an imperial career

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Abstract:

The Indian Revolt of 1857 has a central place in the history of the British Empire. Discussions of its impact have been largely confined to Britain and India, however, and its ramifications for other areas of the Empire remain relatively unexplored. This paper examines the career of Sir George Grey in the wake of the rebellion to show that the events of 1857 had a profound impact on imperial policy in the white settler colonies. As governor of the Cape Colony during the Indian uprising, Grey contributed regiments, horses, and artillery to British efforts in India. Additionally, he mobilized volunteers from the German Legion stationed in South Africa to serve in India, and sent 32 officers and 1,028 men without consulting London. In response to his independent actions, Grey was recalled to England. Due to his intense popularity among colonists and his ability to suppress the threat of native resistance, Grey was reinstated to office within weeks. Further, in 1861, he was appointed governor of New Zealand, with the remit to improve relations between the Maori and the British settlers. His tendency to make decisions independent of the wishes of the Colonial Office raised significant criticism and, with no Indian uprising to justify his actions, Grey was forced to retire from imperial service in 1868. The uprising in India in 1857 offered an opportunity for both settlers and officials to discuss the appropriate role of colonial governors in imperial crises. Grey's career rode the waves of this debate and, consequently, provides a window into the ways the Indian Revolt shaped imperial relations and colonial governance.

Sir George Grey and the 1857 Indian Revolt: the unmaking and making of an imperial career

By Jill C. Bender

The Great Indian Revolt began as a mutiny of troops in the north Indian town of Meerut on May 10, 1857. The ensuing violence widened into a massive civil rebellion and for nearly eighteen months much of India was up in arms against British power. While the Revolt has a central place in the history of the British Empire, discussions of its impact have been largely confined to Britain and India. Its ramifications for other areas of the Empire remain relatively unexplored. This essay seeks to remedy this neglect of scholarship, recognizing that events in India emanated to the Empire as a whole. In particular, the Cape Colony in South Africa was affected by the crisis in India, and the prompt response of the colony's governor, Sir George Grey, created lasting implications for methods of imperial governance.

As governor of the Cape Colony and high commissioner of South Africa in 1857, Grey contributed regiments, horses and artillery to British efforts in India. Additionally, he mobilized volunteers from the German Legion stationed in South Africa to serve in India, and sent 32 officers and 1,028 men without consulting London. He has been both highly praised and heavily criticized for his actions. From his first dispatch during the Revolt to his death in 1898, Grey's contemporaries sought to understand and explain his role in the suppression of the uprising.

Not surprisingly, Grey's decisions have continued to spark similar discussion among historians. As Leigh Dale has recently noted, "Grey's reputation – and debates about it – span the English speaking world."¹ Following the trajectory of nineteenth-century debates, much of the scholarship examining Grey's response to the Indian Revolt has judged his actions, either favorably or critically, in an effort to understand them. In 1961, J. Rutherford argued that Grey, when left to his own discretion, acted admirably and offered considerable assistance to the British in India. However, the eventual intervention of London officials put Grey on the defense. As a result, according to Rutherford, when orders from London did not suit Grey's own ambitions, he was much less cooperative and did not hesitate to be purposefully misleading in his communication with imperial administrators.² In 1987, Donovan Williams came to Grey's rescue,

arguing that Rutherford had “over-reacted” in his “harsh criticism” of the Cape Colony governor. According to Williams, the inconsistencies in Grey’s actions stemmed from the difficulty of facing a tight situation on the spot in the colonies, while also attempting to follow distant orders from London. Given the circumstances, Williams asserted, Grey’s mistakes were excusable, and his “eagerness to help India and protect the Cape Colony” was motivated by a genuine loyalty to the Empire that deserves “more prominence than it has received in the annals of the British Empire.”³

While this essay draws from this literature, I do not wish to engage in this debate directly. Rather than attempt to explain Grey’s decisions, this essay examines responses to his actions, both in London and the colonies, for insight into the imperial impact of the 1857 Indian Revolt. Events in India had important repercussions for imperial policy, and Sir George Grey’s response to the rebellion helped to shape notions of colonial governance and perceptions of imperial control. In recent years, scholars of imperial history have encouraged a networked conception of the nineteenth-century British Empire, emphasizing the “webs” of communication that connected disparate locations.⁴ The connections between India and the Cape Colony facilitated British success in suppressing the Revolt and re-establishing imperial control in India. Further, Grey exercised links to London, India, and New Zealand when responding to the rebellion, and his actions generated debate regarding imperial relations. As such, the Indian Revolt of 1857 had a wide impact with lasting implications for methods of British imperial rule.

The Cape Colony and the 1857 Indian Revolt:

When the sepoys of the XI Native cavalry mutinied the night of May 10, 1857, news of the rebellion traveled quickly by mid-nineteenth-century standards. The London correspondent to the *Times*, located at Marseilles, was notified of the Revolt on June 6, 1857, and promptly transmitted the information via telegraph to London. The *Times* published a report on the uprising in its second edition later that same day, less than one month after the initial rebellion.⁵ Following publication in London, news of the Revolt was disseminated to various locations within the Empire.

News of the uprising, however, was also launched along communication lines connecting the disparate colonies. Within weeks of the rebellion’s outbreak, the Indian

government sent a dispatch to the Cape Colony, requesting an urgent transfer of troops to aid British efforts in India.⁶ As a result of the direct communication, reports of the rebellion reached the Cape in an unprecedented 26 days and were first published in South African newspapers on August 6, 1857, nearly three weeks before London intelligence reached the colony.⁷ From the start, thus, colonial connections shaped the impact of the Indian Revolt on the Cape Colony, ensuring that South Africa would be affected with or without mediation from London.

Residents of the Cape Colony immediately recognized their association with India, commenting that “the Indian connection of so many years duration has linked many a Cape family with the distant East.”⁸ By the time the first news from London reached the Cape on August 26, the names of friends and relatives had begun to appear on the lists of missing and killed arriving from India, and the Cape Colony was consumed by “consternation.” According to the *Cape Argus*, it was these familial connections that initially alarmed the Cape colonists and “enlist[ed] their sympathies on the part of our suffering fellow-countrymen.”⁹ In response, the colonists immediately rallied behind the British cause in India.

If the links between India and South Africa were not lost on the Cape colonists, nor were they lost on their governor, Sir George Grey. Rather, Grey recognized the Revolt as an opportunity for closer imperial relations, and devised a number of plans for the Cape Colony and India to assist each other in the wake of the uprising. He considered transporting sepoys and their families to South Africa to take the place of British regiments, offered to organize the “Fingos, Hottentots, and Kafirs” for service in India, and proposed that the King of Delhi be exiled to the Cape.¹⁰ Although few of Grey’s plans came to fruition, his suggestions sparked discussion regarding the appropriate role of colonial governors in moments of imperial crises. Additionally, those plans that were carried out generated significant support for Grey among the colonists, and increased his popularity throughout the Cape Colony.

Cape support for India was widespread and, over time, took a number of different forms. Initially, the colonists and their governor were particularly successful at organizing military assistance. From the start, the *Cape Argus* encouraged the governor to send regiments immediately, reminding its readers that “in such cases time is

everything.”¹¹ Additionally, the newspaper reported that interest in serving in India was by no means limited to those already enlisted. Rather, “the members of the Cape Royal Rifles, a volunteer corps not long formed in Cape Town, tendered their services to His Excellency, as did many of the other inhabitants, stating that they were willing to be disposed of in any way His Excellency might see fit.”¹² Grey accepted the offers of assistance, and was quick to contribute troops. He immediately dispatched the 89th garrison from Cape Town, a battalion originally under orders to leave for New Zealand, and diverted troops *en route* to China to meet the growing disaster in India. By the time the Revolt was suppressed, the Cape Colony had contributed six regiments to the effort.

In addition to military support, the governor assisted Cape officials in efforts to provide financial assistance for those touched by the violence. In November 1857, the *Cape Argus* covered a public meeting held to organize relief efforts for those in India. The governor delivered the opening address, announcing the creation of a committee to “solicit subscriptions” to relieve the distress caused by “the mutinies and unparalleled atrocities of the Sepoys in India.”¹³ In addition to providing financial aid for the rebellion’s suppression, the committee proposed raising funds for survivors and the families of those serving in India. According to the newspaper, Grey recognized that the rebellion had placed the families of soldiers in the “utmost unfortunate circumstances, and many regiments, instead of going home from their various stations, have been hurried off to India, and consequently their wives and families have been left scattered all over the face of the earth.”¹⁴ Furthermore, many of these men would not return, “for the loss of life amongst our soldiery in India will necessarily be very great.”¹⁵ While precedent existed for the families of soldiers to receive relief while their loved ones were away fighting, no system was in place to assist the family should the soldier be killed in action. Given the large number of troops originating in South Africa, and the grave situation in India, Cape Colony officials proposed establishing a relief fund for widows and orphans with the hopes that “the claims of this class of sufferers, here and elsewhere, will attract the notice of the charitable and humane throughout the empire.”¹⁶

The calls for relief attracted attention throughout the Cape Colony. In December 1857, the *Cape Argus* reported that colonists had responded generously and that “all classes contribute according to their means.”¹⁷ Further, societal organizations, including

the Cape Royals, the Masonic bodies, and the Odd-Fellows had offered their support. While assistance was welcome and often a source of pride for the colony, the system was not immune to abuse and occasionally presented problems for colonial administrators. In December 1857, the *Cape Argus* reported that the Cape Town Municipal Commissioners had been discovered to have donated “funds collected for lighting, watching, and improving the City,” rather than their own money.¹⁸ In response, the Cape Town Wardmasters had refused the contributions, a decision fully supported by the *Cape Argus*. According to the newspaper, permitting funds to be misapplied, “even for so great, so good an object as the relief of sufferers in India,” would establish “a precedent for all sorts of abuses.”¹⁹ While the Indian uprising provided an opportunity for various colonies to rally to the aid of the Empire, this support was not to be offered to the financial detriment of other colonies. The priority of colonial administrators was to protect each individual colony and to ensure the smooth progress of day-to-day activities on the spot. Only once peace and prosperity were achieved in each colony, could attention be turned to the larger Empire.

At times, efforts to balance support for immediate crises at home with those in other colonies strained imperial relations. Despite the seemingly generous Cape donations to the Indian Sufferers Relief Fund, obtaining assistance for widows and orphans living in the Cape Colony could be difficult and present a source of tension. On January 30, 1857, the *Cape Argus* reported that one Captain Hardie and two of his companymen had been killed at Lucknow. The newspaper assumed that the men’s widows, who lived in the Cape Colony, would receive compensation from the Relief Fund, asserting that “their claims on the Fund are certainly as good as any of those who have suffered in India; and the application of the money to this object cannot but be regarded as perfectly legitimate.”²⁰ Weeks later, however, when relief had not been provided, the Cape colonists formed a subcommittee to inquire into the matter. Further, the local relief fund members announced the decision “to forego sending any more money to Calcutta till it be seen whether any portion of the funds should be required by widows and orphans in this city.”²¹ Withholding donations proved to be successful. By March, the *Cape Argus* reported that the widows had begun to receive weekly assistance from the Fund.²² While the Indian Rebellion provided an opportunity for the various

colonies to rally together, thus, it also raised questions as to how much support was necessary and how each colony was to be compensated for its efforts.

In addition to testing, and potentially strengthening, the connections existing between locations in the Empire, the crisis in India also presented opportunities for individual colonies to benefit. In particular, the need to suppress the violence in India promised to stimulate economic development in the Cape Colony. Requests for Cape horses to supply the British cavalry in India virtually transformed the Cape breeding industry. Prior to the uprising, the colony rarely supplied India with horses. This was due to the system of obtaining horses, which was both expensive and failed to provide more than a moderate supply. Additionally, unrealistic expectations on the part of authorities in India, administrative problems, and a seeming “lack of enterprise on the part of local farmers” discouraged horse trade between the colonies. All of this, however, “was swept aside with the outbreak of the Mutiny.”²³

The Cape colonists were well aware of the economic prospects offered by India’s call for horse remounts. The head of the Remount Agency, Colonel Apperley had written a letter outlining the demand for horses in India, which was translated into Dutch and “circulated throughout the country, both by the Government and the Cape of Good Hope Agricultural Society.”²⁴ In January 1858, the *Cape Argus* discussed a pamphlet entitled “Can the Cape supply horses for the Indian service?” published by the Auditor-General Major Hope. According to the article, Hope answered the question posed in his title affirmatively, arguing that the Cape’s resources were crucial to British success in India. According to Hope:

The Cape may be regarded as the connecting point between England and India, and the turning of the tide in the affairs of India. If in this crisis proper advantages are taken of the position of the Cape, as a depôt for troops, as a source from which to draw horses, and other supplies, India may be vastly benefited,...as well as calling out the resources of this colony, to the advantage of both countries and governments.²⁵

The 1857 Indian Mutiny was the Cape’s moment to shine. The violence provided the colony with an opportunity to play an integral role in protecting the Empire. And, in doing so, the colony could mobilize and encourage the development of its own economic resources.

The matter of horse remounts for India became a hotly debated topic in the colony and the subject of two blue books, both published in 1858. Following the publication of the blue books, the subject was also taken up in a series of articles printed in the *Cape Monthly Magazine*.²⁶ In particular, in September 1858, T. B. Bayley published an article entitled “Cape Horses for Indian Remounts.” Similar to Major Hope, Bayley enthusiastically supported horse breeding in the Cape in order to meet the Indian demand. Bayley, however, encouraged the Cape colonists to look beyond the current crisis in India and to plan for long-term economic development. He argued that the opportunity could extend “far beyond the mere amount of money” generated by the sale of horses to create a demand for “forage” and stimulate further agricultural production. The development of horse breeding offered lasting economic potential for the Cape Colony. With this in mind, Bayley asserted that, rather than simply taking advantage of the inflated prices stemming from the crisis in India, the Cape’s horse breeders needed to request fair prices and focus on developing a regular and lasting market.²⁷

The long-term potential of horse breeding aside, Grey scrambled to meet the short-term demands and managed to ship 4,014 horses to India within two months of hearing of the rebellion.²⁸ Initially, Grey’s prompt contribution of regiments and remounts was a source of significant pride in the Cape Colony. At an Agricultural and Horticultural Societies Banquet dinner in November 1857, the Cape’s participation in the capture of Delhi and the relief of Lucknow was the subject of numerous toasts and source of much applause. According to the *Cape Argus*, following dinner and “the usual loyal toasts,” the Societies’ chairman, the Honorable Rawson W. Rawson, offered a toast to Britain’s army and navy. In recounting Britain’s recent success in India, he noted, “It is also a great gratification to learn, that the Cape has been able to contribute in no small degree to this happy result.” He later added that the governor-general of India had expressed similar appreciation for the assistance of both the governor and the people of the Cape Colony.²⁹

The *Cape Argus* rarely hesitated to publish evidence of admiration for the colony when expressed elsewhere in the Empire. In October 1857, the newspaper reported that the Bombay *Oriental News* considered the Cape’s assistance to be “glorious news” that proved “absence and long estrangement will render the ties which bind us to the mother

country the stronger and closer. In her hours of peril, the sons of England gather round her...With colonies like the Cape, Canada, and Australia, England must dominate over the world.”³⁰ The 1857 Indian Revolt, therefore, provided an opportunity for Britons throughout the world to unite and demonstrate their loyalty to the wider Empire. The Cape’s involvement in the suppression of the rebellion was not only necessary to maintain Britain’s presence in India, but also played a crucial role in establishing the greater strength of the Empire.

Recognition of the Cape’s involvement spread beyond South Africa and India. In London, the *Times* ran a lead article in October praising the response of various colonies to the uprising in India. In particular, the article emphasized that “it is at the Cape,..., as might be expected from the magnitude and resources of the colony, that the zeal and energy of the Governor and people have been most signally expressed.”³¹ Similarly, newspapers in New Zealand, where Grey had formerly served as colonial governor, kept tabs on the activities of the imperial administrator. In April 1858, the *Taranaki Herald* commented on the prompt response of the Cape colonists, reporting that “When it was known that assistance was required in India, every soldier in the western districts of the Cape was ready for ‘marching orders’ within 24 hours.”³² According to the newspaper, the event filled Grey with pride in his colony, reminding him of the worth of his appointment – “a thing which he had before very often doubted.”³³

According to both newspapers, the Cape colonists’ supportive response exemplified the magnitude of the emergency in India, as previous efforts to exercise imperial policy at the Cape had fallen short. When Grey had proposed that the Cape Colony be used as a penal settlement, he was met with strong opposition by the colonists. According to the *Taranaki Herald*, the same “energies” that once had been used “during the memorable and never-to-be-forgotten ‘stand’ against Lord Grey’s plot” to introduce British prisoners to the colony were now being directed toward assisting India.³⁴ Similarly, the *Times* argued that the “ranklings” heard earlier against Grey had “utterly vanished before the demands of this painful conjuncture.”³⁵ Grey’s response to the crisis in India, therefore, had elicited support among colonists and increased his popularity. Additionally, the Indian Revolt had provided an opportunity for the colony to unify in

support of the larger cause, and the colonists had responded enthusiastically. In doing so, they had drawn the colony and the Empire more tightly together.

Sir George Grey and the 1857 Indian Revolt:

Events in India not only provided an opportunity for Grey to strengthen his relationship with his colonial subjects, but also allowed him to tighten his control over African peoples. The 1857 Indian Revolt transformed how the British understood their relationship with the colonized and gave rise to an imperial policy dependent upon the greater exercise of force. As early as May 1858, the *Cape Argus* recognized this transformation, commenting:

There was a time, in India, when the idea of a native army opposing itself to the English would have been laughed to scorn. But the die has been cast, the venture has been made and its effect is, that a thorough change has been wrought in the minds of the people by this rebellion. This change is said to have been marked by all who have thought over the rebellion, and studied its characteristics, and it seems to proclaim, that henceforth England must hold India by the power of the sword.³⁶

This shift in policy was by no means limited to British rule in India. The events in India significantly influenced Grey's native policy in South Africa, and shaped reactions to his methods of colonial governance.

Throughout the 1850s, Sir George Grey and the Cape Colony had witnessed their share of difficult situations with regards to the colonized. Just months before Grey received word of the uprising in India, the Xhosa people had suffered a famine following the widespread slaughter of their cattle.³⁷ The "cattle-killing" tragedy of 1857 occurred when a young girl, Nongqawuse, prophesied that the Xhosa people should kill their cattle and destroy their crops in preparation for an ancestral resurrection. According to British interviews with Nongqawuse, the risen ancestors had promised her that, should their requests be followed, more Xhosa ancestors would appear to provide food and to "drive the English out of the country."³⁸ The Xhosa adhered to Nongqawuse's prophesy and the outcome was widespread starvation.³⁹

The 1857 cattle-killing, together with the 1857 Indian Rebellion, facilitated the implementation of Grey's frontier policy. Since his arrival to the Cape Colony in 1854,

Grey had sought to control the Africans by integrating settlers and natives on the frontier, thus introducing the natives to British cultural and political norms.⁴⁰ The cattle-killing provided him with an opportunity to continue to advocate integration, while implementing methods of direct rule. Following the tragedy, Africans were moved onto sites selected by special magistrates, consolidated into villages “not exceeding 200 huts,” and required to pay taxes.⁴¹

As the natives were being relocated, rumors that the “kafirs” had received word of the rebellion in India and were planning a similar uprising flooded the Cape Colony.⁴² In response, Grey held the Gcaleka Xhosa chief, Sarhili, responsible.⁴³ Grey accused Sarhili of using Nongqawuse’s prophesy as a political tool to unite the Xhosa chiefs, before spreading stories of the Indian uprising to incite rebellion.⁴⁴ The Frontier Police, under the leadership of Walter Currie and with the support of Grey, drove Sarhili and his people from British Kaffraria and seized the territory for British settlement.⁴⁵ While the 1857 cattle-killing provided the opportunity to bring the Xhosa and their land under British control, the 1857 Indian Rebellion provided the justification.

Just as Grey used the 1857 Indian uprising to justify his policies, others pointed to the violence in India to criticize the governor’s actions. Not everyone was convinced by the magnitude of the threat in Kaffraria, or the sincerity of Grey’s response to the crisis in India. Rather, some accused the governor of exaggerating the problems in the Cape Colony to avoid sending troops to India. In a letter to the Editor, published on August 26, 1857, Adderley admonished the *Times* for understating the importance that the Cape Colony provided troops for India. Adderley argued that the colony had plenty of soldiers to spare and reminded readers that, in addition to British regiments, German settlers had been encouraged to immigrate to the region and were being employed as soldiers in South Africa, at the expense of British taxpayers. Further, he asserted that there was no need for any troops to be kept at the colony, the mere possibility of a “Caffre” war being “absurd.”⁴⁶

The *Times* followed up with a lead article heavily criticizing Grey’s use of troops in the Cape Colony. According to the newspaper, troops were maintained in the colony not for protection, but to encourage economic prosperity.

The produce of the Cape, consisting of hides, of good wool, and of bad wine, may serve to pay for hardware and cotton goods which are required for consumption; but the most profitable import consists in remittances for the service of the army... Wherever an English force is stationed all markets rise, and it is not unlikely that even Cape Madeira may find a ready sale among the soldiers.⁴⁷

The presence of troops in the colony, therefore, allowed the Cape to draw funds from the Imperial Treasury and guaranteed a ready supply of consumers for Cape products. They were not needed for defense. As a result, the article encouraged London officials to draw regiments from the Cape for assistance in India. However, the newspaper also warned that “no unnecessary discretion ought to be vested in Colonial Governors, who may exaggerate their own local wants” and fail to provide the resources and troops necessary for the imperial crisis.⁴⁸ In response, the *Cape Argus* dismissed the statements as “scarcely worthy of consideration.”⁴⁹

Although the *Cape Argus* came to the governor’s defense, by the early months of 1858, imperial administrators were not alone in their frustrations with Grey’s colonial policy. Rather, the Cape colonists, too, questioned the motivation behind the governor’s actions, expressing doubt that he always had the colony’s best interests at heart. As noted above, when news of the uprising first reached Grey he initially recognized the crisis as an opportunity for the Cape Colony. In particular, he (and others) entertained the possibility of transporting sepoys to the Cape to ease the labor shortage in the colony.⁵⁰ In September 1857, the *Cape Argus* printed a letter to the editor by J. H. van Renen, the late Captain of the Bengal Army. Van Renen recommended that the “least guilty” sepoys be transported to the Cape Colony to be employed “on the public works, such as the harbour of refuge.”⁵¹ Although government officials briefly entertained van Renen’s proposal, the increasingly gruesome stories coming out of India discouraged administrators from putting it into practice. In March 1858, the *Cape Argus* reported that “the accounts which had been received here of the revolting atrocities committed by the mutineers in India had created such a feeling in this colony, that His Excellency was compelled to request that no action might be taken upon the previous communication” until the governor had an opportunity to consult the Cape Parliament.⁵²

For the *Cape Argus*, the issue was not so much that Grey had entertained the possibility of offering employment to “ten thousand Sepoy cut-throats” (although that,

too, concerned them); the real problem, rather, lay in the fact that Grey had initially ignored the role of the Cape Parliament in making the decision. Grey's initial interest had destroyed his "reputation as a wise man," and exposed the need to reexamine the relationship between the governor and Parliament as well as the existing power structure in the colony.⁵³ This would not be the only time that the newspaper expressed frustration with Grey's use of power, and the appropriate role of colonial governors became an ongoing subject of debate.

In April, the *Cape Argus* ran an article comparing Grey with John Scott, the lieutenant-governor of Natal, whose native policy had suffered significant opposition following the introduction of representative government in 1856.⁵⁴ Differences between the two existed – in Natal, colonists complained of a tyrannical governor "without a policy," while the Cape faced a governor with "too much policy." Both colonies recognized, however, that the real problem existed in the structure of colonial governments and the lack of respect shown the colonial parliaments. According to the newspaper, Natal and the Cape Colony "are agreed that they have been seduced into believing that they live under the British constitution, and under a representative local Government, and discover too late that their respective legislatures have been reduced to a farce by their respected Governors."⁵⁵ In the case of Grey, the abuse of power was further complicated by the fact that in addition to colonial governor, he was also the High Commissioner of South Africa. As a result, whenever "Beaten from Sebastopol as Governor, he can take shelter in his Gibraltar as High Commissioner, and there is impregnable." While the Cape Parliament could check his actions as governor, as High Commissioner he was "above and beyond control."⁵⁶

In April 1858, concern regarding Grey's use of colonial power was taken up by the Cape Parliament, and the *Cape Argus* later reprinted the debates in a special supplement. A Mr. Solomon sparked the discussions by introducing a motion to limit the use of the Frontier Police to conflicts within the colony's borders. In seconding the motion, Dr. Tancred argued that Grey's use of the police to expel Sarhili and suppress disputes in Kaffraria had been expansionist, aggressive, and had abused colonial resources. "If you want to make an acquisition, you must send British troops there, and not the Frontier Police."⁵⁷ In reality, Tancred did not agree with British acquisition of the

region at all, asserting that the British had “no right” to seize “kafir” land, and in doing so would stretch British power thin and, consequently, threaten the strength of the wider Empire. Although he focused on the governor’s native policy, Tancred also pointed in passing to Grey’s use of troops in India and argued, “I don’t want to go into that Indian affair, but you had no more right to conquer India than I had to take this book out of the hon. Member for Cape Town’s hands.”⁵⁸ In opposing Grey’s policies, Tancred not only raised questions about the Cape Colony, but also generated discussion of imperial policy. India represented one more example of British colonial exploitation.

For most members of the Cape Parliament, however, Grey’s ability to balance the crisis in India with the potential conflict in the Cape exemplified his strengths as a colonial governor. The Colonial Secretary argued that once reports from India had reached the Cape, Sarhili had eagerly spread the news that “there were difficulties in India” and encouraged African chiefs to “unite with him, and to renew their attempts against the British.”⁵⁹ The governor, recognizing the possibility that the natives might attack during the colony’s hour of weakness, simply attacked first. Similarly, the Auditor-General argued that Grey had contributed as many troops as possible to India. To send more troops would have been unwise, adding to the “confusion” in India and placing the Cape in danger by giving the “Kafirs an idea that there was nothing left to oppose them.”⁶⁰ Further, he defended Grey’s native policy, asserting that the governor had done all he could to assist Sarhili and had only fought when necessary. His decision to remove the chief from the colony “was an act of pure defence, and not for aggression, or the acquisition of British territory.”⁶¹ For many, thus, the 1857 Indian Revolt exemplified the potential danger posed by colonized natives, be they Indian sepoys or African “kafirs.” Following debate, the Cape Parliament ruled that Grey had wielded his gubernatorial power responsibly and dismissed the motion to restrict the use of the Frontier Police.

Although Grey’s frontier policy and treatment of Sarhili had received a stamp of approval from the Cape Parliament in May 1858, his policies continued to face criticism from colonial officials in London. From the outbreak of the Indian Revolt in 1857 to June 1859, Grey and the Colonial Office consistently butted heads. In January 1858, the government published the official correspondence regarding the dispatch of troops to

India. In a review of the blue book, the *Times* concluded, “it appears from the papers before us that, although so much dependence was placed on him [Grey], the supply of reinforcements to India by him afforded was really very insignificant.”⁶² In addition to Grey’s decisions regarding troops for India, London officials criticized his use of British regiments in the Cape Colony and opposed his proposal to federate the colonies of Southern Africa. In June 1859, citing Grey’s tendency to disobey, his policy toward German immigration, and his excessive expenditure of imperial funds, the Secretary of State, Bulwer Lytton, announced Grey’s formal recall.⁶³

News of Grey’s recall was met with indignation and considerable opposition by the Cape colonists. Petitions were submitted to the Colonial Government expressing support for Grey, not only by the British settlers but also by African natives.⁶⁴ Meetings were held throughout the colony, “deploring his recall and in many cases asking for his reinstatement.”⁶⁵ The South African press closely covered the event, and the reports were reprinted in New Zealand. In October 1859, the *Taranaki Herald* reprinted an article from the *Eastern Province Herald* questioning Grey’s removal as governor:

Is it because Sir George Grey, when Governor of New Zealand, once postponed the promulgation of a constitution of Conservative origin, for which the Colony was not ripe...? Or is it because his Excellency...introduced a number of German immigrants upon a guarantee of Kaffrarian debentures? Or is it because Sir George Grey had the hardihood to defend himself when his conduct was impugned in the matter of troops for India? In a word, is it because his Excellency dared to be independent – dared to sacrifice the good opinion of a Prime Minister to the interests of his charge – strong in the consciousness of his own integrity, and the ultimate justice and sovereignty of the English people?⁶⁶

The *Eastern Province Herald* determined that, in reality, Grey had been recalled simply for doing his job and fulfilling his duty to the colony and the Empire. While the newspaper was quick to note that it did not endorse all of Grey’s actions as governor, it emphasized that he had proven to be the “best qualified Governor” the colony had seen.⁶⁷ Similarly, at the time of his departure, the *Cape Argus* noted that the “recall of Sir George Grey is deeply regretted by the whole colony.”⁶⁸ Despite the momentary frustration with his frontier policy and treatment of Sarhili, thus, the colony supported Grey to the very end of his governorship and deemed his performance to have been far beyond satisfactory.

When notified of his recall, Grey defended himself by pointing to his actions during the Indian Revolt, as members of the Cape Parliament had done earlier. Grey argued that he had warned the Imperial Government that an increase in expenditure would be necessary if he was expected to both maintain peace in the Cape Colony and contribute troops to India. His actions should not have been unexpected. Further, Grey argued,

In taking this course, I acted to the best of my judgment for the good of the service, and I still think I acted rightly; whilst the Indian authorities have gratefully acknowledged the importance of the assistance rendered. What would have been thought of me if, neglecting to act as I did, I had allowed a Kaffir war to break out here whilst the mutinies still raged in India; and if, consequently, instead of being able so largely to aid that possession of the Crown, I had called for increased assistance, and I had placed this country in jeopardy, whilst Great Britain required to put forth all her energies elsewhere, would it have been held a sufficient excuse to say that I could only have furnished the aid I did to India, and have prevented a Kaffir war, by spending 10,000 *l.*, or 15,000 *l.*, and that I feared to take the responsibility of doing so?⁶⁹

Had he not acted in this manner, the British Empire may have faced much greater problems than an overextended bank account. Further, he argued, when ruling a colony, the occasional need for additional funds should be anticipated. “In affairs, of such magnitude, and in finding suddenly such large re-enforcements for an empire in peril, the expenditure of some thousands of pounds cannot be sometimes avoided.”⁷⁰ If imperial crises such as the 1857 Indian Revolt could not always be predicted, nor could the expense and difficulties involved in their suppression.

Grey was an ambitious and headstrong colonial administrator, whose policies both generated nods of approval and eyebrows raised in opposition. Although his actions during the Indian Revolt certainly fueled discussion, at times, even Grey seemed a pawn in debates regarding the appropriate colonial response to large scale imperial crises. Within weeks of Grey’s recall, the Derby-Disraeli Ministry fell to a second Palmerston administration. As a result, Lytton was succeeded as Secretary of State by the fifth Duke of Newcastle. Despite his disapproval of the governor’s conduct, Newcastle recognized Grey’s potential to establish “peaceful relations” between the settlers and the natives.⁷¹ As a result, after requesting Grey’s assurance that he would adhere to the new Government’s policies, Newcastle reinstated him as governor of the Cape Colony.⁷²

Newcastle's dispatch notifying Grey of his reappointment arrived in Cape Town only days after the recalled governor had sailed for England. He was notified of the situation upon landing, and shortly after accepted Newcastle's offer.⁷³

Implications for Imperial Governance:

In the wake of the uprising, colonial officials throughout the Empire expressed fears of native rebellion, and condoned the use of force to maintain British control and hegemony. Cape colonists voiced concerns that the sepoy rebellion would spark similar resistance among the "kafirs" of South Africa, and Grey pointed to potential rebellion to justify his frontier policy. Similarly, in New Zealand, reports of another "Cawnpore" circulated among British troops sent to suppress Maori resistance, and colonists expressed frustration with current native policy.⁷⁴ With his past experience in New Zealand and his recent success in the Cape Colony, Grey appeared the ideal colonial governor to solve the burgeoning crisis in New Zealand.

Since 1838, relations between British settlers and the Maori had been loosely regulated by the Treaty of Waitangi.⁷⁵ Although colonial administrators and native chiefs alike had signed the document, British settlers and courts frequently ignored the Treaty's authority.⁷⁶ During Grey's first administration as New Zealand's colonial governor (1845-1853), the number of British settlers in the colony had doubled, increasing Maori resentment of European settlement and bringing the question of land sovereignty to the forefront of colonial concerns. The tension in the colony only heightened after Grey's departure, and during the 1850s, the Maori chiefs unified under the King Movement, creating a social and political organization to reassert native control over the land.⁷⁷

The situation came to a head in 1860, and violence erupted when Governor Thomas Gore Browne's request to purchase land in Waitara was denied. Fighting took place in the region for nearly a year, reaching a stalemate by April 1861. Having lost the trust of the Maori chiefs, Browne was unable to establish peace in the colony and was recalled by London officials. Grey had recently expressed "interest in returning to office in New Zealand, offering to assist in any capacity," and, following Browne's dismissal, London officials took Grey up on his offer and appealed to him for help.⁷⁸

In the colony, Grey's reappointment seemed to signal that the Imperial Government recognized the serious threat posed by the Maori. The *Taranaki Herald* expressed hope that London officials would put their "full trust" in Grey to act appropriately and would not send him "merely to retrace their steps for them." In the past, the Imperial Government had intervened too heavily, and what was needed was a governor who would "exchange the politician for the statesman," and simply get the job done without catering to every wish expressed by those in London. According to the newspaper, Grey, with the support of the Imperial Government, would provide "every sort of means for an effectual settlement of the native question." Additionally, the newspaper went on to predict, "He will probably have *carte blanche* for all his demands. His policy may be sharp at first, or it may be conciliatory; but we may reasonably expect it will not be weak, or weakly backed."⁷⁹ Grey's work was cut out for him, but his recent success in balancing the needs of the Empire in India with the local threat faced in the Cape Colony suggested that he was more than capable. London officials were equally optimistic. During his previous term, Grey had been noted for his strong working relationship with the Maori chiefs, and, in 1861, colonial officials were hopeful that he might re-establish this rapport to ease the present tension. The realization that force might be required, however, was duly noted, and Newcastle instructed Grey that, should his peace efforts fail, he was encouraged "to wage war resolutely."⁸⁰

Grey's second term as New Zealand's colonial governor proved to be less successful than the first. He was unable to establish peace with the Maori and war broke out in Waikato in 1863. The wars of 1863-1864 coincided with Colonial Office efforts to withdraw British troops from the Empire and place questions of defense and policy-making into the hands of the colonial governments. In the case of New Zealand, as long as the threat from the Maori persisted, the Imperial Government agreed to provide troops and financial assistance to defend the settlers. The arrangement, however, resulted in disagreement regarding the necessary and appropriate role of British troops in the colony.⁸¹ Throughout his second administration, Grey's methods of governance elicited significant official criticism, similar to that expressed during his South African governorship in 1858. London administrators accused Grey of failing to keep the Colonial Office informed, of continuing to draw on the commissariat to pay imperial

troops, and of neglecting to return regiments to England when requested.⁸² As a result, when his term came to an end in early 1868, Grey was not reappointed. With no Indian uprising to justify his decisions, Grey had little choice but to retire from Britain's imperial service.⁸³

Following his death in 1898, Grey's actions during the 1857 Indian Revolt again became a point of contention. In an obituary published on September 20, 1898, the *Times* remembered Grey as an independent and often controversial colonial administrator, who was not much liked by the Ministers. Among the article's more positive recollections of Grey was his response to the Indian uprising. The newspaper reported that it was Grey "who really took the initiative in the generous course of action for which Lord Elgin has received deserved commendation...he sent everything he could spare from the scarcely pacified Cape – troops, guns, specie, & c., down to his own carriage horses."⁸⁴ The comment elicited significant response from readers. Throughout October 1898, the *Times* published a number of letters to the Editor – some argued that Elgin had been responsible for diverting troops to India, others agreed with the *Times* version of events, and one correspondent diplomatically asserted that "both Elgin and Sir George Grey acted independently in sending troops to Calcutta."⁸⁵ The debate resurfaced just over ten years later, following publication of James Collier's biography of Grey.⁸⁶

Regardless of whether Grey had saved India, in many ways, India had saved him – or, at the very least, his career. The 1857 Indian Revolt transformed British expectations of their colonial governors, requiring them to demonstrate respect for native tradition and cultures, while simultaneously implementing force to maintain British control. In many ways, Grey proved to be the ideal colonial governor in the wake of the rebellion. He showed an avid (if colonial) interest in the native people subject to his control, sponsoring cultural projects in the Cape Colony and publishing four volumes of Maori traditions, songs, and proverbs.⁸⁷ His banishment of Sarhili and his resort to war in Waikato in 1863, however, reflected a willingness to implement force. Grey's recognition of the Indian uprising as an opportunity for the Cape Colony to assist the Empire and to economically prosper, and his maintenance of troops to protect British settlers generated significant support in the colonies. Although often a thorn in the side of London officials, Grey proved to be among the most popular of colonial governors in

the nineteenth century. Furthermore, even the Colonial Office, caught in the aftermath of the initial uprising in India, determined Grey to be a capable and efficient administrator and chose to overlook his faults.

So long as the Empire as a whole was seemingly under threat, Grey's brand of governance was backed by colonists and London officials, alike. Not hesitating to draw on imperial connections and exercise great force, Grey appeared the go-to man in the face of native resistance. Once fears of an Empire-wide rebellion had faded and threats appeared localized, however, London officials deemed Grey a renegade colonial governor who abused imperial resources for his own popularity and power. The 1857 Indian Revolt changed notions of imperial governance, and Grey was perfectly positioned to capitalize on the transformation. As the *Eastern Province Herald* noted, his actions during the Indian uprising showed him to be "pre-eminently the right man in the right place."⁸⁸ One decade later, as London administrators turned their attentions on the relationship between the white settler communities and London, Grey's autonomous actions appeared less a defense of the Empire and more a threat to imperial unity.

¹ Leigh Dale, "George Grey in Ireland: narrative and network," *Colonial Lives Across the British Empire: Imperial Career in the Long Nineteenth Century*, eds. David Lambert and Alan Lester (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 147.

² J. Rutherford, *Sir George Grey K.C.B., 1812-1898: A Study in Colonial Government* (London: Cassell, 1961).

³ Donovan Williams, "The Indian Mutiny of 1857 and the Cape Colony Part I: Sir George Grey (A reassessment). Troops and Horses," *Historia* 32, 1 (May 1987), 64.

⁴ See David Lambert and Alan Lester, eds., *Colonial Lives Across the British Empire: Imperial Career in the Long Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Zoë Laidlaw, *Colonial Connections, 1815-45: patronage, the information revolution and colonial government* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005); Tony Ballantyne, *Orientalism and race: Aryanism in the British Empire* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave, 2002).

⁵ Peter Putnis, "The Indian Uprising of 1857 as a Global Media Event," unpublished paper given at the International Association for Media and Communication Research, Cairo, July 2006.

⁶ Donovan Williams, "The Indian Mutiny of 1857 and the Cape Colony Part I: Sir George Grey (A reassessment). Troops and Horses," *Historia* 32, 1 (May 1987), 57.

⁷ Peter Putnis, "The Indian Uprising of 1857 as a Global Media Event," unpublished paper given at the International Association for Media and Communication Research, Cairo, July 2006.

⁸ *Cape Argus*, August 8, 1857.

⁹ *Cape Argus*, August 26, 1857.

¹⁰ J. Rutherford, *Sir George Grey K.C.B., 1812-1898: A Study in Colonial Government* (London: Cassell, 1961), 374-375. For a detailed discussion of Grey's proposal to banish the king of Delhi to the Cape see

Donovan Williams, "An Echo of the Indian Mutiny: the proposed banishment of Bahadur Shah II to the Cape Colony, 1857," *Historia* 17, no. 4 (1972), 265-268.

¹¹ *Cape Argus*, August 26, 1857.

¹² *Cape Argus*, August 26, 1857.

¹³ *Cape Argus*, November 11, 1857.

¹⁴ *Cape Argus*, November 11, 1857.

¹⁵ *Cape Argus*, November 11, 1857.

¹⁶ *Cape Argus*, November 11, 1857.

¹⁷ *Cape Argus*, December 2, 1857.

¹⁸ *Cape Argus*, December 2, 1857.

¹⁹ *Cape Argus*, December 2, 1857.

²⁰ *Cape Argus*, January 30, 1858.

²¹ *Cape Argus*, February 6, 1858.

²² *Cape Argus*, March 27, 1858.

²³ Donovan Williams, "The Indian Mutiny of 1857 and the Cape Colony Part I: Sir George Grey (A reassessment). Troops and Horses," *Historia* 32, 1 (May 1987), 65.

²⁴ T. B. Bayley, "Cape Horses for Indian Remounts," *The Cape Monthly Magazine* IV, 21 (September 1858), 130.

²⁵ *Cape Argus*, January 30, 1858. Also cited in Donovan Williams, "The Indian Mutiny of 1857 and the Cape Colony Part I: Sir George Grey (A reassessment). Troops and Horses," *Historia* 32, 1 (May 1987), 69.

²⁶ See "Cape Horses for India," *The Cape Monthly Magazine* IV, 19 (July 1858): 1-10; T. B. Bayley, "Cape Horses for Indian Remounts," *The Cape Monthly Magazine* IV, 21 (September 1858), 129-138.

²⁷ T. B. Bayley, "Cape Horses for Indian Remounts," *The Cape Monthly Magazine* IV, 21 (September 1858), 138.

²⁸ Donovan Williams, "The Indian Mutiny of 1857 and the Cape Colony Part I: Sir George Grey (A reassessment). Troops and Horses," *Historia* 32, 1 (May 1987), 67.

²⁹ *Cape Argus*, November 14, 1857.

³⁰ *Cape Argus*, October 21, 1857.

³¹ *Times*, October 20, 1857.

³² *Taranaki Herald* (as communicated to the *Adelaide Register*), April 17, 1858.

³³ *Taranaki Herald* (as communicated to the *Adelaide Register*), April 17, 1858.

³⁴ *Taranaki Herald* (as communicated to the *Adelaide Register*), April 17, 1858.

³⁵ *Times*, October 20, 1857.

³⁶ *Cape Argus*, May 11, 1858.

³⁷ The Xhosa represented a politically distinct "tribal cluster." Segmentation of fission among the Xhosa people often occurred, however, and independent chiefdoms were established. The Gcaleka Xhosa (referred to below) were a prime example. T. R. H. Davenport and Christopher Saunders, *South Africa: A Modern History*, 5th ed. (Great Britain: MacMillan Press; New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 62-63.

³⁸ Examination of Nonqause before the Chief Commissioner (April 9, 1858), *British Kaffraria Government Gazette*, reprinted in *Grahamstown Journal*, May 1, 1858; quoted in W. P. Morrell, *British Colonial Policy in the mid-Victorian Age: South Africa, New Zealand, the West Indies* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1969), 71-72.

³⁹ T. R. H. Davenport and Christopher Saunders, *South Africa: A Modern History*, 5th ed. (Great Britain: MacMillan Press; New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 141-143; W. P. Morrell, *British Colonial Policy in the mid-Victorian Age: South Africa, New Zealand, the West Indies* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1969), 71-72.

⁴⁰ T. R. H. Davenport and Christopher Saunders, *South Africa: A Modern History*, 5th ed. (Great Britain: MacMillan Press; New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 141.

⁴¹ W. P. Morrell, *British Colonial Policy in the mid-Victorian Age: South Africa, New Zealand, the West Indies* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1969), 87; J. Rutherford, *Sir George Grey K.C.B., 1812-1898: A Study in Colonial Government* (London: Cassell, 1961), 380.

⁴² European settlers occasionally used the term "kafir" to refer to the Xhosa, specifically. More often, however, "kafir, kaffir, and caffre" were used interchangeably to refer to all South African natives.

⁴³ The British referred to Sarhili as Kreli in colonial documents.

⁴⁴ Williams has argued that the Indian Rebellion played an integral role in the development of a “black consciousness” in South Africa and that “certain Blacks, or Black groups, in Caffraria took the Mutiny seriously, looking towards it as a source of encouragement in the constrained circumstances.” Donovan Williams, “The Indian Mutiny of 1857 and the Cape Colony Part II: The emergence of black consciousness in Caffraria,” *Historia* 32, 2 (September 1987), 61.

⁴⁵ W. P. Morrell, *British Colonial Policy in the mid-Victorian Age: South Africa, New Zealand, the West Indies* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1969), 88-89; J. Rutherford, *Sir George Grey K.C.B., 1812-1898: A Study in Colonial Government* (London: Cassell, 1961), 385-389.

⁴⁶ *Times*, August 26, 1857.

⁴⁷ *Times*, August 27, 1857.

⁴⁸ *Times*, August 27, 1857.

⁴⁹ *Cape Argus*, November 7, 1857.

⁵⁰ Similar ideas were entertained with regards to the West Indies. In August 1857, the governor of British Guiana, P. E. Wodehouse sent a memorandum to the secretary for the colonies, Henry Labouchere, discussing the proposal to transfer rebels *en masse* to British Guiana, both to punish the “mutineers” and to ease the labor shortage in the West Indies. See P.E. Wodehouse, *Memorandum [Sepoys to the West Indies]*, (London: [s.n.], 1857).

⁵¹ *Cape Argus*, September 9, 1857.

⁵² *Cape Argus*, March 24, 1858.

⁵³ *Cape Argus*, March 24, 1858.

⁵⁴ From the very introduction of British control of Natal in 1842, colonists had debated the amount of land that should be designated for African settlement. In 1852, lieutenant-governor Sir Benjamin Pine established a commission to review the colony’s land policy. The commission, which was composed primarily of land-owning colonists, recommended significant changes. Pine’s successor, Scott, however, ignored the suggestions, drawing considerable criticism from the colonists. T. R. H. Davenport and Christopher Saunders, *South Africa: A Modern History*, 5th ed. (Great Britain: MacMillan Press; New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 116.

⁵⁵ *Cape Argus*, April 22, 1858.

⁵⁶ *Cape Argus*, May 1, 1858.

⁵⁷ *Cape Argus*, May 11, 1858.

⁵⁸ *Cape Argus*, May 11, 1858.

⁵⁹ *Cape Argus*, May 11, 1858.

⁶⁰ *Cape Argus*, May 11, 1858.

⁶¹ *Cape Argus*, May 11, 1858.

⁶² *Times*, January 15, 1858.

⁶³ J. Rutherford, *Sir George Grey K.C.B., 1812-1898: A Study in Colonial Government* (London: Cassell, 1961), 422-423.

⁶⁴ See *Irish University Press Series of British Parliamentary Papers: Correspondence regarding the establishment of Responsible Government, the Annexation of Griqualand West, and other affairs of the Cape Colony, 1857-73*, vol. 26, *Colonies Africa* (Shannon: Irish University Press, 1971), 96-99.

⁶⁵ W. P. Morrell, *British Colonial Policy in the mid-Victorian Age: South Africa, New Zealand, the West Indies* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1969), 119.

⁶⁶ *Eastern Province Herald*, August 16, 1859, reprinted in the *Taranaki Herald*, October 29, 1959.

⁶⁷ *Eastern Province Herald*, August 16, 1859, reprinted in the *Taranaki Herald*, October 29, 1959.

⁶⁸ *Cape Argus*, August 23, 1859, reprinted in the *Taranaki Herald*, December 17, 1859.

⁶⁹ “Copy of a despatch from Governor Sir George Grey, K.C.B., to the Right Honorable Sir E. B. Lytton, Bart. M.P.,” *Irish University Press Series of British Parliamentary Papers: Correspondence regarding the establishment of Responsible Government, the Annexation of Griqualand West, and other affairs of the Cape Colony, 1857-73*, vol. 26, *Colonies Africa* (Shannon: Irish University Press, 1971), 115-116.

⁷⁰ “Copy of a despatch from Governor Sir George Grey, K.C.B., to the Right Honorable Sir E. B. Lytton,” *Irish University Press Series of British Parliamentary Papers: Correspondence regarding the establishment of Responsible Government, the Annexation of Griqualand West, and other affairs of the Cape Colony, 1857-73*, vol. 26, *Colonies Africa* (Shannon: Irish University Press, 1971), 116.

⁷¹ “Copy of a Despatch from the Duke of Newcastle to Governor Sir George Grey, K. C. B.” *Irish University Press Series of British Parliamentary Papers: Correspondence regarding the establishment of*

Responsible Government, the Annexation of Griqualand West, and other affairs of the Cape Colony, 1857-73, vol. 26, *Colonies Africa* (Shannon: Irish University Press, 1971), 106.

⁷² W. P. Morrell, *British Colonial Policy in the mid-Victorian Age: South Africa, New Zealand, the West Indies* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1969), 119; J. Rutherford, *Sir George Grey K.C.B., 1812-1898: A Study in Colonial Government* (London: Cassell, 1961), 427.

⁷³ J. Rutherford, *Sir George Grey K.C.B., 1812-1898: A Study in Colonial Government* (London: Cassell, 1961), 427.

⁷⁴ William Marjouram, *Sergeant, Sinner, Saint, and Spy. The Taranaki War Diary of Sergeant William Marjouram*, R. A., eds. Laurie Barber, Garry Clayton, and John Tonkin-Covell (Auckland: Random Century, 1990), 30. See also, Julie Evans, *Edward Eyre, race and colonial governance* (Dunedin: University of Otago Press, 2005), 80-81.

⁷⁵ The treaty established three basic tenets: the Maori chiefs would consent to British rule, in return the British Crown would guarantee Maori land possession and would purchase any land the Maori wished to sell, and the Maori were granted the rights of British subjects. See Raewyn Dalziel, "Southern Islands: New Zealand and Polynesia," *Oxford History of the British Empire*, vol. III, *The Nineteenth Century*, ed. Andrew Porter (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 573-596.

⁷⁶ Raewyn Dalziel, "Southern Islands: New Zealand and Polynesia," *Oxford History of the British Empire*, vol. III, *The Nineteenth Century*, ed. Andrew Porter (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 579.

⁷⁷ J. Rutherford, *Sir George Grey K.C.B., 1812-1898: A Study in Colonial Government* (London: Cassell, 1961), 447.

⁷⁸ W. P. Morrell, *British Colonial Policy in the mid-Victorian Age: South Africa, New Zealand, the West Indies* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1969), 270.

⁷⁹ *Taranaki Herald*, August 17, 1861.

⁸⁰ J. Rutherford, *Sir George Grey K.C.B., 1812-1898: A Study in Colonial Government* (London: Cassell, 1961), 451.

⁸¹ Raewyn Dalziel, "Southern Islands: New Zealand and Polynesia," *Oxford History of the British Empire*, vol. III, *The Nineteenth Century*, ed. Andrew Porter (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 586.

⁸² J. Rutherford, *Sir George Grey K.C.B., 1812-1898: A Study in Colonial Government* (London: Cassell, 1961), 555-556.

⁸³ Although 1868 marked the end of Grey's imperial service, he later enjoyed a career in New Zealand politics, serving as the colony's premier from 1877 to 1879.

⁸⁴ *Times*, September 20, 1898.

⁸⁵ *Times*, October 25, 1898. See also *Times*, October 4, 6, 18, 31, 1898. Rutherford also refers to the *Times* debate, concluding that Elgin and Grey redirected troops to India, independently. See J. Rutherford, *Sir George Grey K.C.B., 1812-1898: A Study in Colonial Government* (London: Cassell, 1961), (footnote 374), 312.

⁸⁶ See *Times*, August 27, 31, 1909; *Times*, September 3, 7, 8, 14, 1909. See James Collier, *Sir George Grey, governor, high commissioner, and premier: an historical biography* (Christchurch, New Zealand: Whitcombe and Tombs, 1909).

⁸⁷ James Belich, "Grey, Sir George (1812–1898)," *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, eds. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: Oxford University Press); online ed., ed. Lawrence Goldman, May 2006, <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/11534> (accessed May 29, 2007).

⁸⁸ *Eastern Province Herald*, August 16, 1859, reprinted in the *Taranaki Herald*, October 29, 1859.